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Abstract 
Recent changes in market dynamics of electronic and mobile commerce mean that users of online 
services are no longer “passive agents of consumption”. Instead online business models increasingly 
provide a platform for user interaction while simultaneously relying on the contributions made by 
those users for the population of those spaces. Like many other online services that form part of the 
Web 2.0 economy, SNS, in the main, are offered free at the point of access. Instead of charging their 
users a monetary fee, most SNS providers generate revenue through payments they receive from third 
parties in exchange for the right directly to display advertising to their users or in exchange for 
providing aggregated data on those users’ behaviour, likes and dislikes. This means that users now 
“pay’” for online services with the personal information they disclose. Despite repeated 
announcements by members of the SNS industry that they are committed to the protection of their 
users’ online privacy, it can therefore not be denied that, in practice, a high level of privacy protection 
is likely to be in stark conflict with SNS providers’ business objectives and that, in reality, most SNS 
providers are entirely dependent for their market position on promoting an environment that 
encourages “openness” and widespread information-sharing by their users through the use of default 
privacy settings and the subtle encouragement of maximum disclosure in the form of financial and 
non-financial incentives (for example, additional “free” functionality). This article will examine the 
implications of these technical, economical and social developments of internet users’ rights to 
privacy under the current EU data protection framework and whether the changes to that framework 
proposed by the European Commission in 2012 are likely to address the policy issues identified. 
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One step forward, two steps back? 
Critical observations on the proposed reform of the EU data pro-
tection framework 
Judith Rauhofer1 
 
Recent changes in market dynamics of electronic and mobile commerce mean that users of online 
services are no longer “passive agents of consumption”. Instead online business models increasingly 
provide a platform for user interaction while simultaneously relying on the contributions made by 
those users for the population of those spaces. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the area of social 
networking where services like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter allow customers to present an online 
version of themselves to others and to engage with friends, family and virtual strangers in online 
conversations.  
A recent Pew Internet survey2 found that in 2012, 67 per cent of all adult Internet users in the US used 
social networking services (SNS), up from 65 per cent in the previous year and 61 per cent in the year 
before. In the UK, the Office of National Statistic’s 2011 Statistical Bulletin on Internet Access identi-
fies social networking as one of the most popular online activities with 48 per cent of Internet users 
saying they took part in social networking3. SNS are increasingly embraced by older4 as well as 
younger5 users and their integration into everyday life is slowly changing the way in which individuals 
communicate, socialise, organise their lives, and engage with commercial players.  
Despite the astounding increase in their user base over a relatively short period of time, one of the key 
challenges for SNS has always been the development of a credible monetisation strategy that 
encourages investment and allows for further innovation with a view to securing a foothold in a fast-
changing market. Like many other online services that form part of the Web 2.0 economy, SNS, in the 
main, are offered free at the point of access. Instead of charging their users a monetary fee, most SNS 
providers generate revenue through payments they receive from third parties in exchange for the right 
directly to display advertising to their users or in exchange for providing aggregated data on those 
users’ behaviour, likes and dislikes.  
According to Gartner, worldwide social media revenue is expected to reach $16.9 billion in 2012, an 
increase of 43.1 per cent from 20116. Of this amount $8.8 billion is said to derive from advertising 
revenue. New advertising models like social advertising and peer recommendations (for example, 
Facebook’s “Like” and Google’s “+1” buttons) only serve to illustrate further the online industry’s 
continuing commitment to this business model and its resulting desire to maximise revenue through 
________________
 
1 Lecturer in IT Law, University of Edinburgh. 
2 Pew Internet & American Life Project Poll, November 2012, available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Static-Pages/Data-
Tools/Explore-Survey-Questions/Roper-Ce2ter.aspx?item={63EC8264-EF8F-4F38-B184-AB1D4B4E5FE4}, last visited on 23 
April 2013. 
3 ONS Statistical Bulletin: Internet Access – Households and Individuals, 2012, 24 August 2012, available at 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_275775.pdf, last visited on 23 April 2013. 
4 See Pew Internet: Social Networking 2012, available at http://pewinternet.org/Commentary/2012/March/Pew-Internet-Social-
Networking-full-detail.aspx, last visited on 23 April 2013: the percentage of US internet users aged between 50-64 who use SNS 
rose from 47 percept in 2010 to 52 percept in 2012 while for those over 65 the increase was even steeper (from 26 percept in 2010 
to 33 percept in 2011).  
5 The ONS 2011 Statistical Bulletin on Internet Access (see FN3) states that in the UK 91% of all 16-24 year old Internet users take 
part in social networking activities. According to the EU kids online survey carried out by the London School of Economics, 67% of 
children who use the Internet in the UK have their own social networking profile. This includes 28% of 9-10 year olds and 59% of 
11- 12 year, despite the fact that most SNSs have a minimum age of 13 years; see L Haddon, and S Livingstone, “EU Kids Online: 
National perspectives”, October 2012, p.69; available at  
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/media@lse/research/EUKidsOnline/EU%20Kids%20III/Reports/PerspectivesReport.pdf, last visited 26 
October 2012.  
6 “Gartner Says Worldwide Social Media Revenue Forecast to Reach $16.9 Billion in 2012”, 25 July 2012, available at 
https://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=2092217, last visited on 23 April 2013. 
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the tracking, monitoring and profiling of its user base according to their age, gender, interests, social 
class and financial acumen. 
This means that users now “pay’” for online services with the personal information they disclose. 
Without that personal information, online platforms would lie empty and devoid of substance and 
SNS providers would not be able to produce the “product” (that is, the personal and behavioural data) 
from which they actually derive commercial value. Despite repeated announcements by members of 
the SNS industry that they are committed to the protection of their users’ online privacy, it can 
therefore not be denied that, in practice, a high level of privacy protection is likely to be in stark 
conflict with SNS providers’ business objectives and that, in reality, most SNS providers are entirely 
dependent for their market position on promoting an environment that encourages “openness” and 
widespread information-sharing by their users through the use of default privacy settings and the 
subtle encouragement of maximum disclosure in the form of financial and non-financial incentives 
(for example, additional “free” functionality). 
Information privacy: a paradigm change? 
 
One of the consequences of these developments in the online market place is the change that can 
be observed in the general attitude of individuals as well as public and private entities to the concept 
of information privacy as a whole. This concept is currently the subject of an intense struggle between 
those that argue in favour of preserving its traditional status as a fundamental human right and those 
who emphasise its utility as a quasi-property right that can be freely traded in an open marketplace. 
Within most European countries, the right to a private life as protected by Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and many national constitutions has, at least 
initially, largely been viewed in its public or constitutional law context as a defence against state 
interference. After the experiences during the Third Reich and WWII, an individual’s ability to retire 
to a private sphere that is not observed and that allows him to process information and develop ideas 
and opinions without being subjected to undue influence was seen as an essential prerequisite for the 
active participation of the citizenry in political life and, thus, as a necessary safeguard of the 
democratic system itself.  
As was first highlighted by Westin in 19697 and later confirmed by the German Constitutional 
Court in its Census decision in 19848, individuals must be able to exercise control over their own 
personal information. Where an individual is uncertain of who has access to their information in what 
context and for which purposes, he may feel inhibited in his actions, particularly if those actions chal-
lenge the dominant order or the policies of those in power. Someone who expects, for example, that 
his participation in a public protest or campaign will be officially registered and that this might expose 
him to negative reactions from employers or public bodies, will possibly refrain from participation in 
that protest despite the fact that his right to do so is itself protected as a fundamental right (freedom of 
assembly). According to Simitis, a loss of information privacy (or “informational self-determination”) 
will therefore almost always also constitute a loss of “democratic substance”9. 
In a commercial context, the individual’s right to control personal information about himself has 
initially largely been seen in the context of cases that concerned the misuse or misappropriation of 
personal information by others for their own commercial gain (for example, through faked celebrity 
endorsements or the exposure of the private life of public figures in the tabloid press). Claims against 
private parties based on Article 8 ECHR have been recognised by the European Court of Human 
Rights10 and a system of sanctions and remedies in these cases has been developed in many European 
________________
 
7 AF Westin (1967) “Privacy and Freedom”, New York, Atheneum, p.7. 
8 “Census” decision, BverfGE 65, 1 
9 S Simitis (1984) “Die informationelle Selbstbestimmung – Grundbedingung einer verfassungskonformen Informationsordnung“, 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, pp.394-405 (399). 
10 See, for example, Hannover v Germany 40 EHRR 1, (2005). 
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countries. However, even in a private law setting the discussion within Europe commonly emphasises 
the issue of “control” identified above rather than the question of ownership of data11.  
The property-rights approach has always been promoted most successfully in the United States 
where the right to privacy, to the extent that it is recognised at all, is considered almost exclusively 
within the context of the private law domain. This was already apparent in Warren and Brandeis’ fa-
mous 1890 article on “the right to be let alone”12, which was said to be motivated by the authors’ own 
experience of increasing press intrusion into their private affairs. Despite the fact that case law of the 
US Supreme Court also protects certain aspects of privacy as a defence against state intrusion under 
the Forth Amendment13, the overwhelming majority of US “privacy” cases concern individuals’ 
claims against other private entities.  
 
US privacy law is thus composed almost entirely of a number of separate privacy torts identified 
and summarized by Prosser in 196014. While a detailed examination of those torts is beyond the scope 
of this article, the restrictive way in which they are construed and the remedies and sanctions awarded 
emphasize both the proprietary and the commercial nature of the concept of privacy in this context. 
Privacy is thus seen as an instrument designed to ensure a kind of “parity of arms” between those who 
wish to use others’ personal information for their own commercial benefit and those to whom that 
information relates and who should therefore be entitled to prevent such commercial exploitation or to 
derive some benefit or compensation in exchange.  
 
Westin himself made this point that information privacy should be understood in the context of 
property rights when he argued that “personal information […] should be defined as a property right, 
with all the restraints on interference by public or private authorities and due-process guarantees that 
our law of property has been so skillful in devising”15. More recently, the model for “propertised per-
sonal information” has been revisited by several US scholars who have examined the arguments for 
and against a “market in personal information”16 and who argue that a property-based approach to 
privacy is more likely to be successful in protecting individuals’ personal information from unauthor-
ized access by third parties. It is therefore possible to identify not just a legal but also a cultural and 
historical contrast between the EU and the US concept of privacy. It becomes increasingly clear that 
in order to arrive at a global solution to the new risks that the new online business models pose to 
their users’ privacy, we will first have to address the different perceptions and consequent misunder-
standings that dominate discussions between scholars and lawmakers on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 
It is particularly interesting and illuminating to observe this on-going struggle for primacy in the 
area of privacy protection from the perspective of the UK that has itself strenuously resisted the 
introduction of a right to privacy in a domestic context for most of the 20
th
 century. With an unwritten 
and flexible constitution, the UK lacks a traditional understanding of privacy as a fundamental right. 
Although the UK is a signatory of the ECHR and is therefore required to comply with its Article 8, no 
national catalogue of basic rights includes a specific right to privacy. Similarly, in the private law 
domain no “privacy laws” were ever adopted by the UK Parliament. As recently as 1991, the English 
Court of Appeal was able to maintain that no tort of privacy existed in English law17, which left citi-
zens largely unprotected against intrusions, in particular, by the tabloid press.  
________________
 
11 J.E.J. (Corien) Prins (2006) “Property and Privacy: European Perspectives and the Commodification of Our Identity”, Information 
Law Series, Vol. 16, pp. 223-257 (257). 
12 S Warren and LB Brandeis (1890) “The right to privacy”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. IV, December 15, 1890, No. 5. 
13 Going back to its decision in Katz v United States 389 U.S. 347 in 1967, where it limited the right of law enforcement authorities 
to intercept citizens’ telephone conversations. 
14 D Prosser (1960) “Privacy”, 48 California Law Review 383. 
15 Ibid. at FN7. 
16 See, for example, KC Laudon (1996) “Markets and Privacy”, 39 Communications of the ACM 92-104; J Litmann (2000) “Infor-
mation Privacy/Information Property”, 52 Stanford Law Review 1283-1313; PM Schwartz, (2004) “Property, Privacy, and Personal 
Data”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 117, Vol. 7, p. 2055. For the European perspective, see J.E.J. (Corien) Prins (2006) “Property and 
Privacy: European Perspectives and the Commodification of Our Identity”, Information Law Series, Vol. 16, pp. 223-257. 
17 Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62. 
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This situation only changed fairly recently as a result of two important changes to the UK legal 
framework. First, by virtue of its membership of the European Community (now the European Un-
ion), the UK was required to transpose the EC Data Protection Directive18 into national law through 
the adoption of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA). Around the same time, the then Labour govern-
ment decided to adopt the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) which came into force in 2000. While the 
DPA created a solid legal framework for the processing of personal data by public and private bodies, 
the HRA enabled UK citizens for the first time to enforce the rights guaranteed by the ECHR in the 
domestic courts.  
These events, which represent a principal point of departure in the development of privacy law in 
the UK, sparked a number of court cases – mainly instigated by celebrities and well-known public 
figures - which permitted the courts to carve out a rudimentary right to privacy. This right is currently 
based both, on the provisions of the DPA as well as a reinterpretation of the tort of breach of confi-
dence. Mirroring the developments in the US, this tort now prohibits the “wrongful” or “unjustified 
disclosure of private information”19. However, its provenance is shady to say the least, marrying, as it 
does, a European fundamental rights approach with a US-style property rights approach without ever 
fully embracing or dismissing either. 
Information privacy in the context of the EU data protection framework 
 
Despite the attention the UK courts received when they developed the new right to privacy in its 
private law context, on a day-to-day basis, the requirements of the DPA are likely to have had by far 
the greater impact on UK and non-UK businesses. When examining the history of data protection law 
in Europe, it can immediately be established that it owes much of its existence not only to a general 
desire to protect the individual from arbitrary or unaccountable decision-making by public and private 
bodies, but also to a contrasting desire to facilitate the processing of personal information for public 
policy as well as commercial objectives.  
 
On the one hand, the modern information technology systems, which came into widespread use 
during the 60s, 70s and 80s and which enabled the automated processing, combining, searching and 
sharing of information, alerted lawmakers in many countries to the need for measures that would pre-
vent the misuse of that information. On the other hand, the new technology also opened up new ways 
of achieving administrative, economical and commercial benefits by making the use of personal in-
formation more efficient and by facilitating new administrative and commercial uses of that informa-
tion. New work processes and business models were being developed that required the transfer of 
personal information between different parties and across national borders. In this context, the spectre 
of overly strict data protection laws led to concerns that their adoption might either lead to the devel-
opment of “data havens” elsewhere (and might thus create a competitive disadvantage for the busi-
nesses established in the countries that adopted those laws) or might restrict transborder data flows to 
countries without adequate protection. Data protection laws were therefore often seen by others - in-
cluding in particular the United States with its dominance in the information and information technol-
ogy industry – as “unduly restrictive and blatantly protectionist”20.  
 
As a result, the data protection laws that did eventually develop, both at national and international 
level, in almost all cases sought to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the individual’s and 
________________
 
18 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individua ls with re-
gard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281 , 23.11.1995. Although the UK had previ-
ously adopted its own Data Protection Act 1984, the protection afforded by this Act fell significantly below the level which existed 
in other EU member states at the time.  
19 See, for example, Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; Douglas and others v Hello! Ltd and others [2005] EWCA Civ 595; 
McKennitt and others v Ash and another [2005] EWHC 3003; CC v AB [2006] EWHC 3083; Murray v Express Newspapers plc and 
another [2007] EWHC 1908 (Ch); Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB); and John Terry (previously 
referred to as "LNS") v Persons Unknown [2010] EWHC 119 (QB 
20 J Moakes ‘Data protection in Europe – Part 1’ (1986) 1 Journal of International Banking Law 77 (82) 
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society’s need for the protection of personal information and, on the other hand, the need of busi-
nesses and public bodies for the free flow of data. 
 
This is true for most of the early international instruments, including the OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data21 and the Council of Europe Conven-
tion for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data22, but 
also for the more detailed EU data protection framework that was developed a decade later. That 
framework includes, among other things, the 1995 Data Protection Directive23, the 2001 EC Data Pro-
tection Regulation governing processing activities by the EU institutions24, and the 2002 E-Privacy 
Directive25 (as amended by the 2009 Consumer Rights Directive26). Going forward, the twin objectives 
have also been recognised more recently at EU constitutional level in the form of Article 16 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)27 and Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Human Rights28 (“Protection of personal data”), which came into force in December 2009.  
 
The common denominator between all of these instruments - and the way in which they put those 
twin objectives into practice - is that they are framed in terms of a number of “fair processing princi-
ples” to be observed by those wishing to process personal data. Those principles are founded on the 
basic assumption that any processing of personal data must either be authorised by the data subject 
giving his consent or must be limited to that which is necessary for certain commercial or public pol-
icy purposes. While there are certain analogies between the “consent” condition and the property-
rights approach described above, the other policy-based conditions that form part of the fair process-
ing paradigm provide additional legal grounds for processing. The fair processing paradigm has there-
fore been criticised for providing a lower level of protection to individuals compared to the property-
rights approach precisely because the latter, at first glance, seems to prohibit all processing that is not 
specifically authorised by the “owner” of the data, while the fair processing paradigm makes room for 
additional justifications. 
 
However, this argument ignores the fact that within any society personal data processing without an 
individual’s consent may at times be reasonably necessary in the public interest, in the interest of 
other parties and even in the individual’s own interest (for example, where he is prevented from giv-
ing his consent in case of illness or accident). It is therefore likely that even jurisdictions that gener-
ally follow a property-rights approach would legislate for certain exceptions in these situations (na-
tional security, public health and crime prevention easily spring to mind in this context). The question 
to be answered in those cases is therefore not whether any exceptions to the individual’s right to con-
trol access to their personal data should be provided for at all, but whether a fundamental rights 
framework exists in a given jurisdiction which limits the legislator’s right to erode the general right to 
privacy through an abundance of permissive legal provisions. 
 
________________
 
21 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data of 23 September 1980, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html, last visied at 27 October 2012  
22 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, adopted 
on 28 January 1981, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm, last  visited on 27 October 2012 
23 See FN18. 
24 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community 
institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 8/1, 12.1.2001 
25 Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications 
sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201 , 31.07.2002. 
26 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on 
universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concern ing 
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws , OJ L 337, 
18.12.2009. 
27 OJ C 83/47, 30.3.2010. Article 16 provides that “everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them”, but 
also makes it clear that any EU legislation in this area must address “the rules rela ting to the free movement of such data”. 
28 OJ C83/389, 30.3.2010. The official JUSTICE commentary on Article 8 emphasises that the EU data protection framework, in-
cluding the Charter, was developed “[i]n order to promote th[e] free exchange of information while also respecting  the privacy 
rights of individuals”(emphasis by the author); see JUSTICE commentary on Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; 
available at http://www.eucharter.org/home.php?page_id=82, last visited on 29 October 2012. 
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More importantly, though, both the property-rights and the consent approach to privacy rests on the 
fundamental assumption that individuals will act rationally and in their own best interest when mak-
ing decisions about the disclosure to, or use by, others of their personal data. In light of recent devel-
opments particularly in the online arena, this assumption may have to be revisited. To begin with, the 
by now well-established “privacy paradox”29, that is, the tendency of individuals, on the one hand to 
state that they value privacy while simultaneously engaging in behavior that puts that privacy at risk 
(for example, the disclosure of information on SNS or the use of loyalty cards) shows that most indi-
viduals do not join the “open marketplace” for their personal information as quite the rational actors 
that much economical theory presumes them to be30.  
 Furthermore, data subjects are often at risk of inadvertently losing control over their personal infor-
mation when dealing with those on whom they depend for the provision of jobs, information, goods or 
services. In almost all cases, dependency creates an intrinsic power imbalance, which is likely to ena-
ble the stronger party to put pressure on the weaker one or to manipulate it in often subtle and hence 
potentially unaccountable ways. In the context of data protection, this may mean that the stronger 
party might use its power over the weaker party to effectively force it to consent to certain processing 
activities.  
This phenomenon is well understood with regard to the more traditional relationships, for example, 
employer/employee relationships, where many data protection regulators have already interpreted the 
fact that consent must be “freely given” to mean that, in practice, this all but excludes employers’ 
ability to process employee data solely on the basis of the employee’s consent31. It could increasingly 
be argued, that a comparable power imbalance may determine much of the relationship between In-
ternet users and online service providers, particularly in areas where a lack of competition restricts the 
user’s choice of provider.  
The question therefore is not only whether the property-based approach or the fair pro-
cessing/fundamental rights approach is more suitable to ensure the protection of individuals’ personal 
information, but which additional regulatory safeguards might be necessary with regard to both ap-
proaches.  
Data protection compliance in an SNS context 
Viewing the US and the EU systems side by side, the regulatory burden imposed on US-based 
companies is significantly lower than that of their EU counterparts. While some requirements exist 
with regard to information security and data security breaches32, US SNS providers are by and large 
free to process as much of their users’ personal information as those users are willing to disclose to 
them33. In this situation, it is easy to the see the attraction of a property-rights approach, as this would 
ensure some protection for those users willing and able to negotiate access to their personal data. 
________________
 
29 See, for example, PA. Norberg, DR Horne, DA Horne (2007) “The Privacy Paradox: Personal Information Disclosure Intentions 
versus Behaviors”, Journal of Consumer Affairs, Volume 41, Issue 1, pp. 100–126; NF Awad and MS Krishnan (2006) “The Per-
sonalization Privacy Paradox: An Empirical Evaluation of Information Transparency and the Willingness to Be Profiled Online for 
Personalization”, MIS Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 13-28; V Groom and MR Calo (2011) “Reversing the Privacy Paradox: An 
Experimental Study”, TPRC 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1993125.  
30 For recent economical theory on privacy and rational behavior, see also A Acquisti and J Grossklag (2005) “Privacy and Rational-
ity in Individual Decision Making”, EEE Security & Privacy, January/February 2005, pp. 24-30; available at 
http://csis.pace.edu/~ctappert/dps/d861-09/team2-3.pdf, last visited on 29 October 2012. 
31 See for example, paragraph 24, section B9 of the UK Information Commissioner’s “Guide to Data Protection”, which states that 
consent should not be relied upon where the data subject has no real choice but to give it; available at 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/for_organisations/data_protection/the_guide.aspx, last visited on 29 October 2012. 
32 See, for example, California’s Notice of Security Breach law (Cal. Civil Code §1798.29). 
33 Companies providing sub-contracted data processing services to EU data controllers may be caught by the EU regulatory 
framework through the application of the adequacy principles included in Article 25(1) of the Data Protection Directive 
(implemented in the UK through the eighth data protection principle, paragraph 8, Part I, Schedule 1, DPA ). This restricts the 
transfer of personal data to countries outside the European Economic Area to those countries that have in place adequate protection 
of personal data or where adequacy can be otherwise adduced. A transfer to a US company is generally permitted provided that 
company has signed up to the safe harbour framework enforced, in the main, by the US Federal Trade Commission (see 
http://export.gov/safeharbor/). In addition, data processing activities of US SNS providers may fall within the territorial scope of the 
EU data protection regime, if one of the conditions set out in Article 4(1) of the Data Protection is fulfilled. This includes cases 
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SNS providers that are established in an EU member state, on the other hand, fall within the scope of 
the EU data protection framework (as implemented by the relevant member state).  SNS providers 
commonly aim to achieve compliance with the requirements of that framework through a mixture of 
contractual agreements (including terms of business and privacy policies), technical features 
(including privacy settings and defaults) and industry standards and self-regulation. In a 2009 opinion 
on how the operation of SNS can meet the requirements of EU data protection legislation34, the EU’s 
Article 29 Working Party made it clear that both SNS providers and providers of individual 
applications on SNS are data controllers under Article 2(d) of the Data Protection Directive35. This 
means that SNS providers must comply with the provisions of national legislation implementing that 
Directive and the E-Privacy Directive when collecting and further processing their users’ personal 
data.  
To ensure compliance, SNS providers must, among other things, provide their users with certain 
fair processing information about the provider’s identity and the purposes for which they intend to 
process users’ personal data. This fair processing information must be provided before the start of the 
data processing activities36, that is, before or at the point of collection. In practice, providers will often 
include this information in their terms of business and their privacy policies. Nevertheless, the fair 
information requirement has been criticised by many data controllers as unduly burdensome, 
particularly in areas, where the risk of material harm is low. 
In addition to the fair processing requirement, Article 7(1) of the Data Protection Directive 
(implemented in the UK through Schedule 2 of the DPA) provides that personal data may only be 
processed if one of a number of enumerative conditions is met37.  In addition to the data subject’s 
consent, processing is lawful if it is necessary to perform a contract with the individual, to comply 
with a legal obligation of the provider (for example, in order to establish the age of the user) or for the 
legitimate interests of the provider or a third party to whom the provider discloses the data (except 
where it is unwarranted because it is prejudicial to the individual).  
The data protection framework only applies to the processing of “personal data”. As the use of 
electronic communications systems and online services generates several new types of data, which 
lawmakers did not specifically take into account when the Data Protection Directive was adopted in 
1995, there has been some discussion recently about whether its material scope is still appropriate for 
the digital age.  
 
In the majority of cases, SNS providers and providers of applications offered to SNS users rely on 
users’ consent. In the UK, this consent is usually obtained by implying users’ acceptance of a privacy 
policy either through specific consent wording in the policy itself or through a statement on the sign-
up page, which the user must acknowledge by ticking a box or clicking a button38.  
 
Of the other available legal grounds on which data controllers may rely to justify their processing 
activities in the absence of user consent, the condition contained in Article 7(f) of the Data Protection 
Directive (“processing for the legitimate interest of the data controller or a third party”) can probably 
be seen as facilitating the most permissive processing of personal data.  
 
However, in response to complaints from both industry and civil society that the Directive is increas-
ingly out of date, The EU institutions are currently discussing a reform of the EU data protection 
________________
 
where the processing is carried out in the context of the activities of a branch office that the US company has established in an EU 
member state or if the processor makes use of equipment situated in a member state as part of their processing activities.  
34 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking, 12 June 2009. 
35 In the UK, this definition is mirrored in section 1(1), DPA. 
36 In the UK, this requirement is included in the first data protection principle, paragraph 1, Part I and paragraphs 1-4, Part II to 
Schedule 1, DPA. 
37 For a detailed interpretation of the “enumerative” nature of the legal grounds contained in Article 7(1), see the ECJ’s decis ion in 
Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito and Federación de Comercio Electrónico y Marketing Directo v 
Administración del Estado Joined cases C-468/10 and C-469/10, 24 November 2011. 
38 See below for a more detailed description of the UK’s approach to obtaining consent.  
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framework, which is specifically intended to adapt that framework to the new technological reality39. 
The relevant changes proposed in this respect will be the focus of the remainder of this article. 
EU data protection reform 
In January 2012, the European Commission published its long-awaited proposals for the revision 
of the Data Protection Directive40. The centrepiece of the reform package is a draft Regulation41 that 
would replace the existing regime. The reform proposals follow several years of discussions at EU 
and member state level, including two stakeholder consultations (in 200942 and 201043) and the publi-
cation by the European Commission of a Communication “A comprehensive approach on personal 
data protection in the European Union”44 in November 2010.  
 
The draft Regulation contains measures that would harmonise data protection procedures and en-
forcement across the EU, and achieve consistency with the existing system for ensuring privacy 
online set out in the E-Privacy Directive. It would also expand the application of the EU regime to 
data controllers that are not established in the EU but whose processing activities are related to (1) the 
offering of goods or services to EU data subjects; or (2) the monitoring of those data subjects’ behav-
iour45. This would bring the majority of SNS providers within the reach of the new regime, even if 
they do not operate a branch office in an EU member state. The governments of many non-EU coun-
tries and particularly the US, where nearly all of the most popular SNS providers are established, 
therefore closely watch the progress of the reform proposals. 
 
The draft Regulation includes nine substantive chapters, covering among other things the subject 
matter and scope of the Regulation, revised definitions, revised data protection principles, new obliga-
tions on data controllers and data processors and a revised framework for the transfer of personal data 
to third countries or international institutions. The Regulation would be directly binding on data con-
trollers immediately upon coming into force without the need for implementation by the member 
states46. 
 
The explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft Regulation specifically acknowledges the 
impact that technological change has had on the existing framework and the need for reform. Recital 5 
of the draft Regulation also highlights the fact that: 
 
“[r]apid technological developments have brought new challenges for the protection of 
personal data. The scale of data sharing and collecting has increased dramatically. 
Technology allows both private companies and public authorities to make use of per-
sonal data on an unprecedented scale in order to pursue their activities. Individuals in-
creasingly make personal information available publicly and globally47”.  
________________
 
39 See the Explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), 25.1.2012, COM(2012) 11 
final, p. 1.  
40 Commission press release “Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of data protection rules to increase users' control of 
their data and to cut costs for businesses”, 25 January 2012, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-
46_en.htm?locale=en, last visited on 30 October 2012; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected 
World A European Data Protection Framework for the 21st Century”, COM/2012/09 final. 
41 See FN39. 
42 “Consultation on the legal framework for the fundamental right to protection of personal data”, 31.12.2009, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/opinion/090709_en.htm, last visited on 30 October 2012. 
43 “Consultation on the Commission's comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union”, 4. 11.2012, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/news_consulting_0006_en.htm, last visited on 30 October 2012. 
44 COM(2010) 609 final, 4.11.2010. 
45 Article 3(2), draft Data Protection Regulation. 
46 Article 288, TFEU. 
47 Recital 5, Draft General Data Protection Regulation, 
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The Recital specifically emphasises the economical impact that technological development has had 
and the explanatory memorandum highlights the information economy’s central role in the Digital 
Agenda for Europe48, and more generally in the Europe 2020 Strategy49. It sees the reform as an oppor-
tunity to further facilitate the free flow of data within the European Union and the transfer to third 
countries and international organisations with a view to encouraging new means of communication, 
new business models and economic growth.  
 
The explanatory memorandum professes that this can be done while still ensuring a high level of 
privacy protection within the EU. However, there has been no shortage of criticism from privacy ad-
vocates50, who claim that the draft Regulation is in danger of upsetting the delicate balance between 
the two objectives that have defined the EU data protection framework for the past decades and that 
any additional safeguards it offers to protect individuals’ privacy rights in the online environment are 
offset by other provisions that grant data controllers more extensive rights to collect and process per-
sonal data. Of the many fault lines identified by those privacy advocates in this context, this article 
will look more closely at only two that affect the processing operations of SNS, namely the changes 
proposed to the legitimate interest condition and the concept of consent. 
Legitimate interest 
Under Article 7(1) of the Data Protection Directive (implemented in the UK through paragraph 6 
of Schedule 2 to the DPA), SNS providers may be able to justify their processing activities on the 
grounds that such processing is necessary for the purpose of their legitimate interest or the legitimate 
interest of third parties to whom they disclose their users’ personal data. This legal ground is subject 
to an exception where “the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject” override 
such interests. 
 
In practice, this means, that data controllers can undertake a wide range of processing activities 
without the data subject’s consent, provided that these activities are in some way related, among other 
things, to their commercial aims and objectives. Both in the UK and at EU level, very little guidance 
is available on how the legitimate interest condition is to be interpreted. The ICO, in legal guidance 
which has since been replace by its - in this context at least, less informative “Guide to Data Protec-
tion” - indicated that it intended to “take a wide view of the legitimate interests condition” 51. It sug-
gested that it would apply two tests to establish whether this condition may be appropriate in any par-
ticular case. First it would dermine the legitimacy of the interests pursued by the data controller or the 
third party to whom the data are to be disclosed, and second, it would establish whether the processing 
is unwarranted in any particular case by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate 
interests of the data subject that override those of the data controller. The ICO’s legal guidance specif-
ically highlighted that “[t]he fact that the processing of the personal data may prejudice a particular 
data subject does not necessarily render the whole processing operation prejudicial to all the data sub-
jects”52. 
________________
 
48 COM(2010)245 final. 
49 COM(2010)2020 final. 
50 See for example, D Korff (2012) “Comments on Selected Topics in the Draft EU Data Protection Regulation - Summaries and 
Proposed Amendments Only”, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2150151 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2150151; 
European Digital Rights: Position on the Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), available at 
http://edri.org/files/1012EDRi_full_position.pdf; Article 29 Working Party Opinion 01/2012 on the data protection reform proposals 
(WP191), 23 March 2012, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2012/wp191_en.pdf; Article 29 Working Party Opinion 08/2012 providing further input on the data protec-
tion reform discussions (WP199), 5 October 2012, ttp://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2012/wp199_en.pdf; and EDPS Opinion on the data protection reform package, 7 March 2012, available at 
http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2012/12-03-
07_EDPS_Reform_package_EN.pdf, all last visited on 31 October 2012. 
51 ICO “Data Protection Act 1998 - Legal Guidance”, pp. 20-21, available at 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/data_protection_act_legal_guidance.pd
f, last visited 1 November 2012. 
52 ibid. 
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Applying these two tests, one could imagine, for example, that the following activities might fall 
within the scope of the legitimate interest condition: a data controller’s interest in marketing its goods 
or services, including the data mining and profiling that, in the online environment is often a prerequi-
site for such marketing; an employer’s interest in monitoring its employees’ performance, and even a 
company’s interest in selling its customer database as part of its assets. The problem in many cases is 
likely to be that, at least in the short term, none of these activities seem to cause any actual harm to, or 
seem to affect the interests of, the data subject. However, the question that has not yet been sufficient-
ly explored is what long-term effect these activities may have not only on individual data subjects, but 
also on the distribution of powers between certain categories of data controllers and data subjects. If, 
for instance, online providers can use this condition to establish a large database about their users’ 
personal circumstance, likes and dislikes, to what extent does this affect their bargaining position vis-
a-vis those users in the future? The old adage that “information is power” springs to mind in this con-
text, and it is difficult to deny that, if two parties have at their disposal very different amounts of in-
formation about each other when considering the conditions on which they are prepared to enter into a 
contractual relationship, the odds - during the contractual bargaining - are likely to be stacked in fa-
vour of the party that knows more about the other party. In addition, there are other potential long-
term consequences that could arise for the interests of data subjects through the mere fact that their 
data is stored by a data controller, for example, information and data security issues. There is also the 
possibility that the data might be made available, voluntarily or because of a legal obligation, to third 
parties without the data subject’s consent in the future, thereby possibly establishing an entirely new 
set of power imbalances that affect the data subject’s rights.  
 
The wide interpretation of the legitimate interest condition combined with a seemingly omnipres-
ent desire to collect ever more personal data “just in case” for the purposes of risk management 53 
therefore severely affects the principle of control that defines the concept of information privacy and 
that is otherwise intended to underpin the existing data protection framework. Without more specific 
guidance on which of the data controller’s interests can be viewed as “legitimate” it could be said that 
this condition is able to drive a horse and carriage through the protection afforded to data subjects by 
the existing data protection regime. 
 
Going forward, the existing condition is mirrored to a large extent in Article 6(1)(f) of the draft 
Regulation. However, Article 19 of the draft Regulation now grants the data subject a "right to object" 
to processing that is being conducted without his consent. While much of this right is based on Article 
14 of the existing Directive, it includes some significant modifications regarding the burden of proof 
and its application to direct marketing. Where this right is exercised, the processing must stop. 
 
Under Article 14 of the Data Protection Directive, the burden of proof for establishing that his in-
terests or rights and freedoms override the legitimate interests of the data controller falls on the data 
subject. This means that the data subject has to prove that compelling legal grounds exist for why the 
processing should not take place. If the data subject is unable to provide evidence for this contention, 
the controller’s processing activities are deemed to be lawful. 
 
In contrast, Article 19(1) of the draft Regulation grants the data subject a right to object, on 
grounds related to his personal situation, to any processing justified by the data controller on the basis 
of, among other things, Article 6(1)(f). This means that the data subject’s right to prevent such pro-
cessing exists ab initio, and it now falls to the data controller to demonstrate that he has compelling 
legitimate grounds for the processing which override the data subject's interests or fundamental rights 
and freedoms.  
 
________________
 
53 For a detailed examination of the relationship between risk awareness and the willingness to disclose personal information, see J 
Rauhofer (2008) ”’Privacy is dead, get over it!’ Information privacy and the dream of a risk-free society”, Information and Commu-
nications Technology Law Vol. 17 Issue 3, pp. 185-197 
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This effectively constitutes a reversal of the burden of proof compared to the current situation, 
which will make it more difficult for the data controller to rely on legitimate interest grounds to justify 
his processing activates. In practice, this will particularly affect data controllers who habitually rely 
on the "legitimate interest" condition. If the provision is adopted in this form, data controllers may 
therefore, at first glance, find it considerably more difficult to justify certain processing activities un-
der the new regime. Both the concepts of "necessity" and "compelling legitimate grounds" now seem 
to be weighed heavily in favour of the data subject. 
 
However, the practical effect of this reversal of the burden of proof may be significantly lessened 
by the complexity of the provision, the intricacies of which may escape many an average data subject. 
Although, Recital 38 and Article 14(1)(b) promote more transparency by imposing an obligation on 
the data controller to explicitly inform the data subject about the legitimate interests pursued and on 
the data subject’s right to object, judging on past form, few data subjects, particularly in the online 
environment, will take much notice of the ever increasing amount of “fair processing information” 
directed at them and will thus often not be aware of their right to object. Even where such awareness 
can be created through the additional obligation set out in Recital 38, many data subjects will still feel 
that they do not have the bargaining power to resist the collection and further processing of their data. 
Similarly, the fact that Article 28(2)(c) obliges the data controller to document his legitimate interests 
as part of his wider documentation obligations is unlikely to have much practical impact on the deci-
sion-making powers of the average data subject. The mere fact that data subjects must invoke their 
overriding interests and that, unless data subjects exercise their right to object, the proposed pro-
cessing activity is deemed to be lawful, sits uneasily with experiences of current levels of user inertia. 
Although some would argue that data subjects should be expected to accept a certain amount of per-
sonal responsibility for protecting their own information, it is more than likely that on current levels 
of awareness, skill and education, the majority of data subjects will just not benefit from the revisions 
of the legal framework currently under consideration.  
 
What the Regulation, like its predecessor, specifically lacks at this stage is sufficient guidance on 
which of the data controller’s interests can be considered “legitimate”. Some attempts to provide such 
guidance can be found in Recital 39, which makes it clear that data processing for the purposes of 
ensuring network and information security constitutes a legitimate interest of the concerned data con-
troller. But save for this provision, any determination of this question is postponed to a later stage 
through Article 6(5) of the draft Regulation, which grants powers to the European Commission to 
adopt delegated acts for this purpose. This approach can be criticized for several reasons.  
 
First, Article 6(5) leaves the right to make vital decisions about the practical implementation of 
one of the most popular legal grounds for data processing to an executive body, which has limited 
legitimacy for making those determinations. As some observers, including, for example, the EDPS, 
have already highlighted, the extensive use of delegated powers in the draft Regulation may in fact 
violate Article 290(1) TFEU54, which restricts the use of delegated acts to non-essential elements. It 
could be argued that the concrete form of the legitimate interest condition should be considered an 
essential element to be included in the draft Regulation itself, given the condition’s practical impact, 
both qualitatively and quantitatively, on the rights of the data subject. 
 
Second, even if one were to accept that the further clarification of the condition can be deferred to 
a point after the adoption of the Regulation, the European Commission seems a curious choice as the 
body tasked with the interpretation of data protection laws when, until now, guidance on the meaning 
of specific legal provisions has been provided by the Article 29 Working Party and the national data 
protection authorities. The Commission, in its role as a policymaker, is arguable more susceptible to 
well-funded lobbying from industry stakeholders than most independent regulatory bodies would be. 
There is therefore a danger that the process of determining what the appropriate balance between the 
interests of data subjects and data controllers should be in this context would suffer from reduced 
scrutiny and accountability. A more intuitive approach would therefore be to grant these powers to the 
________________
 
54 FN50, paragraph 74. 
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body replacing the Working Party at EU level and representing the opinions of the national authori-
ties, namely the new European Data Protection Board (EDPB) to be set up under Article 64(1) of the 
draft Regulation. 
 
Finally, the possible time lag between the coming into force of the Regulation and the time at 
which the Commission may be ready to adopt the relevant delegated act may leave a regulatory vacu-
um which could easily be filled by developing market practice that itself might then influence the 
Commission’s judgment on which interests should be considered legitimate. 
 
From a policy point of view, the question therefore arises whether more wide-ranging protections 
are not necessary to achieve the intended aim of  Article 19 of the draft Regulation better to protect 
the data subject’s position vis a vis the data controller with regard to the legitimate interest condition.  
 
The European Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee (LIBE), which at 
the time of writing scrutinizes the draft Regulation as part of the legislative process, has picked up 
many of these points in the draft report it published in January 201355. It suggests that the legitimate 
interest condition should only provide a legal basis for processing in “exceptional circumstance”56 and 
dismisses the idea that the power to further clarify the legitimate interest condition should lie with the 
Commission. Instead, it recommends that Article 6(5) should be deleted and that Article 6(1)(f) 
should be replaced with much more detailed guidance designed to provide legal certainty to the data 
controller. To achieve this aim the draft LIBE report proposes to insert new provisions into the draft 
Regulation, which deal respectively with issues of transparency, the question of what should consti-
tute the data controller’s legitimate interest and the question of how the data subject’s overriding in-
terests should be defined.  
 
New Article 6(1a) includes a binding requirement on the data controller specifically to inform the 
data subject if it processes the data subject's personal data for the purposes of his legitimate interest 57. 
The notification must also set out the data controller's reasons for believing that its interests override 
the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.  Article 6(1b) lists the specific 
circumstances in which the data controller's interests may override the interests of the data subject. 
They include the data controller's freedom of expression, processing for the enforcement of legal 
claims or for preventing or limiting damage to the controller, further processing for direct marketing 
of the controller's own goods or services, processing in the context of professional business-to-
business relationships and processing by not-for-profit organisations for the sole purpose of collecting 
donations. In addition, Recital 39 clarifies that network and information security constitute a legiti-
mate interest. Article 6(1c) lists the specific circumstances in which the data subject's interests over-
ride the legitimate interest of the data controller. This is particularly the case when the processing 
causes a serious risk of damage to the data subject, when sensitive personal data, location data or 
biometric data is processed, when the data is processed in the context of profiling or when it is made 
accessible to a large number of people or where large amounts of data is processed or combined with 
other data, where processing may lead to discrimination against the data subject, and where the data 
subject is a child. 
 
Although the LIBE proposals would go some way towards addressing the issues regarding the le-
gitimate interest condition, there is some doubt over whether or not they will survive even the negotia-
tions between the different parliamentary committees involved in the scrutiny of the draft Regulation. 
At the time of writing, the LIBE Committee has received over 3000 amendments, some of which are 
included in opinions submitted by other committees, some were submitted by individual members of 
the European Parliament.  A group of individual privacy organisations that has examined those 
________________
 
55 Draft report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individual with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), 2012/0011(COD), 16.01.2013. 
Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fNONSGML%2bCOMPARL%2bPE-
501.927%2b04%2bDOC%2bPDF%2bV0%2f%2fEN; last visited on 12 January 2013. 
56 ibid., proposed amendment to Recital 38. 
57 In the Commission’s January 2012 draft, such a requirement is only included in Recital 38. 
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amendments has published a report in April 201358, in which it highlights that rather than “fixing” the 
issues raised in respect of Article 6(1)(f), MEPs are seeking to maintain the existencing broad condi-
tion59 or even to extend its use by proposing that the data controller’s“rights and freedoms to conduct a 
business” should be balanced against the rights and freedoms of the data subject60. The LIBE Commit-
tee is currently expected to adopt its final report in the summer 2013. This would then provide the 
basis for the European Parliament’s negotians with the European Council. 
 
There is a clear argument that a clarification of the legitimate interest condition could provide legal 
certainty and thus save data controllers costs. A tighter regulatory framework might also generate 
increased trust on the part of data subjects that they will not loose control over their personal infor-
mation if they disclose that information when using online services. This, in turn, could lead to an 
increased uptake of those services, which would benefit the digital economy as a whole. 
Consent 
There is currently some uncertainty about the exact nature of consent in a data protection context. 
Article 2(h) of the Data Protection Directive defines consent as the “freely given, specific and 
informed” indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he signifies his agreement to personal data 
relating to him being processed. However, EU member states differ in their implementation of this 
provision61 and in recent months, a chasm has arisen on the interpretation of the limits of consent 
between the Article 29 Working Party and the EDPS on the one hand and the ICO on the other.  
The DPA does not specifically define consent, although national courts need to interpret this term 
by reference to the Data Protection Directive. However, while other EU regulators as well as the 
EDPS and the Article 29 Working Party have repeatedly advocated a restrictive interpretation - 
rejecting, for example, the practice of using pre-ticked boxes to imply consent and arguing in favour 
of a restriction on consent in situation where there is an unequal relationship between the data subject 
and the data controller62 – the ICO has always taken a more relaxed attitude to the concept and, 
particularly, the way in which consent can be obtained.  
The conflict between the institutions came to a head with regard to the interpretation of the consent 
requirement for the setting of cookies that was inserted into Article 5(3) of the E-Privacy Directive by 
the Citizens’ Rights Directive in 2009. After initially following the Working Party’s fairly restrictive 
guidance on the interpretation of consent, the ICO decided to depart from that position in its most 
recent guidance on the use of cookies63, published in May 2012, where it specifically permitted the use 
of “implied” consent contrary to the Working Party’s own guidance. 
________________
 
58 International privacy organisations “Don't let corporations strip citizens of their right to privacy”; available at 
http://edri.org/files/2013-campaign-report.pdf; last visited on 25 March 2013. 
59 AM880 (Louis Michel, ALDE), AM882 (Agust n D az de Mera Garc a Consuegra, Teresa Jim nez-Becerril Barrio, EPP), 
AM883 (Salvatore Iacolino, EPP) and AM884 (Ewald Stadler) to the draft report by Jan Philip Albrecht, 4 March 2013; available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fNONSGML%2bCOMPARL%2bPE-
506.145%2b01%2bDOC%2bPDF%2bV0%2f%2fEN; and AM47, Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs for the Committee on 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Pro-
tection Regulation), 25 March 2013; available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
%2f%2fEP%2f%2fNONSGML%2bCOMPARL%2bPE-494.710%2b02%2bDOC%2bPDF%2bV0%2f%2fEN; AM100, Opinion of 
the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy for the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairson the proposal for 
a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), 26 February 2013; available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fNONSGML%2bCOMPARL%2bPE-
496.562%2b02%2bDOC%2bPDF%2bV0%2f%2fEN; last visitied on 25 April 2013. 
60 ibid., AM873 (Alexander Alvaro, Nadja Hirsch, ALDE), AM874 (Adina-Ioana V lean, Jens Rohde, ALDE) 
61 For an overview of  the concept of consent in EU data protection law, see E Kosta (2013) “Consent in European Data Protection 
Law”, Brill Academic Publishers, Inc. 
62 See, for example, Article 29 Working Party, Working Document on a common interpretation of Article 26(1), adopted on 25 
November 2005, WP114; Article 29 Working Party Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural advertising, 22 June 2010, WP 171; and 
Article 29 Working Party Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent, 13 July 2011, WP187. 
63 ICO: Guidance on the rules on use of cookies and similar technologies, v.3, May 2012. 
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The predominant issue with the use of consent in a data protection context lies in the fact that the 
privacy policies which online providers commonly use to imply their users’ consent to the processing 
of their personal data in many cases lack transparency and that providers have taken advantage of the 
loose regulatory framework which imposes no restrictions on the purposes to which users may 
consent.  Until recently, it was therefore widely felt that a well-written privacy policy can easily be 
employed to obtain carte blanche for almost any processing purpose providers can envisage now or in 
the future, and it is perhaps unsurprising that the length of privacy policies has increased dramatically 
in recent years as providers have added more and more purposes to their lists.  
To illustrate this point, the New York Times published a graphic created by private user Matt 
McKeon in 2010, which shows that the privacy policy used by SNS Facebook had ballooned from 
1004 words in 2005 to 5,830 words in 201064. Its current data use policy65 is layered and consists of six 
main sections and, although designed to be more user friendly, is significantly longer. This volume of 
legalese and the often confusing way in which the information is arranged gives new meaning to the 
phrase ‘hidden in the small print’ and is likely to challenge even the most dedicated user. A lack of 
skill combined with the feeling that nothing can be done to change those policies in any case causes 
the majority of users to simply agree to them without ever reading them. This has made it easy for 
providers to argue that their users have in fact sanctioned all of the provider’s data processing 
activities. However, in light of the clear failings of this approach we must ask ourselves whether, in an 
environment where this type of behaviour is technically possible and legally permitted, user consent is 
still an adequate tool for the authorisation of what constitutes an increasingly severe intrusion into 
users’ private life. 
Interestingly, the issue of privacy policies that are too general and cover too wide an array of data 
types and purposes was recently taken up by the Article 29 Working Party with regard to the Google 
privacy policy. In March 2012, Google updated its terms of service and consolidated over 60 of its 
privacy policies into one single privacy policy with a view to aggregating its users' personal data from 
across all their accounts and services including: Gmail, Google Play, Google+, internet searching, 
map, YouTube, location data and photo sharing. This prompted the Working Party to ask the French 
data protection regulator, CNiL, to lead an investigation into Google's new policy on behalf of the 
national data protection authorities of all member states, and to examine whether Google complies 
with the requirements set out in the Data Protection Directive. In October 2012, the EU data 
protection authorities published their findings66. Among other things, the authorities found that Google 
may have failed to comply with the Data Protection Directive on a number of counts, namely the 
information requirements; the fair and lawful processing requirements; the requirements guaranteeing 
the data subject's right to object to the processing of their personal data; and the right to request 
erasure or blocking of that data. Considering, in particular, the legal grounds for processing personal 
data on the basis of (1) user consent, and (2) legitimate business interest and contract performance, the 
findings could not establish a valid legal ground for the processing in the case of four of the eight 
purposes named in the policy. In particular, the CNiL’s findings reiterate that Google cannot rely on 
user consent in cases where the user is not aware of the exact extent of the combination of the data 
between different Google services67.  
________________
 
64 ‘Facebook Privacy: A Bewildering Tangle of Options’, New York Times online edition at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/05/12/business/facebook-privacy.html (last visited 19 May 2010). 
65 Facebook data use policy; available at http://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/; last visited on 25 April 2013. 
66 Google Privacy Policy: Main Findings and Recommendation, 16 October 2012, available at 
http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/en/GOOGLE_PRIVACY_POLICY-_RECOMMENDATIONS-FINAL-EN.pdf, last visited 
on 30 October 2012. 
67 As Google had not implemented any of the significant compliance measures suggested by the CNiL by April 2013, the data pro-
tection authorities of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK have announced that they will take consolida ted 
action against Google to examine whether its privacy policy complies with their respective national data protection legislation. To 
this end, they have initiated an inspection procedure and set up an international administrative co-operation procedure between 
them, CNiL press release “Google privacy policy: six European data protection authorities to launch coordinated and simultaneous 
enforcement actions”, 2 April 2013; available at http://www.cnil.fr/english/news-and-events/news/article/google-privacy-policy-six-
european-data-protection-authorities-to-launch-coordinated-and-simultaneo/; last visited on 25 April 2013. 
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Following up on the issue raised by the Google case, the Article 29 Working Party simultaneously 
published an opinion on purpose limitation68, it which makes it clear that it views such aggregation of 
data types and purposes as incompatible with the existing legal framework.  In addition, the opinion 
emphasises that vague or general purposes included in providers' privacy policies (for example, "im-
proving user experience" or "marketing") will not usually meet the requirements of the purpose limi-
tation principle set out in Article 6(1)(b) of the Data Protection Directive, that in turn affects the scope 
of the consent that users can give. Nevertheless, it is generally acknowledged that the consent concept 
as included in the Directive has not kept up with technological changes and is in acute need of reform. 
 
Going forward, the initial version of Article 4(8) of the draft Regulation responds to that challenge 
by re-defining the data subject's consent as the  
"freely given, specific, informed and explicit indication of his or her wishes by which the 
data subject, either by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement 
[to processing]”.  
In contrast to the wording of the current Directive, the Regulation would therefore specifically 
require that all consent must be explicit. 
While this definition is in line with recommendations that were made by the Article 29 Working 
Party in 2011, it markedly differs from the most recent interpretation of consent adopted by the ICO. 
For data controllers established in the UK, where they are given significant license to work on the 
basis of implied consent for many processing activities, the need for explicit consent would therefore 
require a major change in practice.  
Although, for internet users, the new definition would undoubtedly have a positive effect (in that 
they would at the very least be required to make a clear statement of assent to the online provider’s 
privacy policy or to take a clear affirmative action, such as ticking a box) it is at least doubtful 
whether this change in business practice would provide sufficient protection for their personal data in 
the long term.  
By far the greater problem with regard to the use of consent in an online environment is the nature 
of online contracts themselves. Generally described as “adhesion contracts”, the business terms and 
privacy policies of online providers are normally drafted in favour of those providers and are not 
negotiable. Their “take-it-or-leave-it” nature leaves the user with a choice either to adhere to the 
provider’s conditions or not to use their service at all.  
It is currently possible to identify four distinct possible ‘fixes’ for the problems arising from SNS 
providers’ reliance on consent as a legal ground for data processing. These include market forces, 
technical features, co-regulatory or self-regulatory control and industry standards and user education. 
Market forces 
Some commentators claim that if left to their own devices, market forces will naturally arrive at an 
optimal level of privacy protection by offering consumers as much privacy as they actually value69 and 
ask for. Those commentators argue that if government intervenes it may artificially distort markets in 
favour of some technologies and against others70. Rejecting this view, Edwards and Brown point out 
that consent given by many SNS users, especially young and inexperienced users, is almost always 
based on a misapprehension of risks71.  
________________
 
68 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation (WP203), 2 April 2013; available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp203_en.pdf; last visited 
on 25 April 2013. 
69
 See, for example, P.H. Rubin & T.M. Lenerd Privacy and the commercial use of personal information (Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2001) (finding no failures in the market for personal information and recommending against government intervention). 
70
 See, e.g., R. C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud, U. Chi. L.& Econ. Working Paper 414, 2008 at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1151985 (last visited 14 July 2010). 
71
 L. Edwards and I. Brown, Data Control and Social Networking: Irreconcilable Ideas?’ in  A. Matwyshyn (ed), Harboring data: 
information security, law and the corporation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). 
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‘It is in human nature to want jam today – fun and frivolity – over jam tomorrow – safety 
and security in some murky future where relationships, job opportunities and promotions 
may be pursued.’72 
This is confirmed by sociological and criminological literature, which has indicated that, 
universally, consumer perceptions of future versus current risks are fundamentally flawed73. A lack of 
risk awareness in the main target group, however, may have a distorting effect on the market in 
question. Viewing the level of actual or potential public dissatisfaction with SNS’ approach to privacy 
protection as the only factor determining a user’s decision on which SNS provider to use ignores the 
fact that users will make that choice based on a variety of factors. 
As a result, market forces are likely to be affected by factors other than simple user demand for the 
best privacy protection. For example, the network effect74 created by popular services is likely to bind 
users closer to individual services (and may therefore indirectly limit their ability to exercise their 
“market power”) until long after they have reached a level of dissatisfaction with the service that 
would normally prompt them to move to a competitor. Market forces on their own are therefore 
unlikely to solve the problems created by the use of consent in an SNS context. 
Technical features 
Some scholars advocate a ‘code solution’ that would allow users to control their personal information 
through, for example, the adjustment of privacy settings. Kesan and Shah argue that such settings 
would be an expression of the user’s personal autonomy and would “provide users with agency” 75. 
Users have a choice in the matter: they can go with the default option or choose another setting. 
However, Kesan and Shah also acknowledge that defaults shape norms and create culture by 
providing a recommendation to the user76. To this extent there is a danger that defaults can 
disempower users as they 
“will be not be seen as defaults but as unchangeable. After all, if people don’t know 
about defaults, they will assume that any alternative settings are impossible or unrea-
sonable”.77 
Edwards and Brown also emphasise the issue of user competence and user inertia. They argue that 
many users will not ever try to find out that settings other than the default exist, “whether through 
ignorance, fear or simple lack of time or energy or imagination”78.  
As has already been explained, there is now a growing tendency among SNS providers to use 
technical means, in the form of default privacy settings, to obtain user consent to a variety of data 
processing activities. In most cases, users are free to change defaults set to “public” but only by 
clicking their way through a variety of often complex and sophisticated choices. While this is 
ostensibly a way to grant users more control over the way in which they share their personal 
________________
 
72
 ibid., 221. 
73
 See further D Apgar (2006) “Risk Intelligence”, Harvard Business School Press; J Rauhofer (2008) “Privacy is dead, get over it! 
Information privacy and the dream of a risk-free society”, Information & Communications Technology Law, Volume 17, Issue 3, 
185-197. 
74 The term ‘network effect’ or ‘network externality’ commonly describes a situation where the the utility that a user derives from 
the consumption of a specific good or service increases with the number of other users consuming the same good or service, see M. 
L. Katz and C. Shapiro, ‘Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility’ (1985) The American Economic Review, Vol. 75, 
No. 3, 424-440. This effect is particularly strong in relation to services that rely on the use of communications technologies; 
services, in other words, that require users’ interaction with other users to fulfil their intended funct ion. For example, the utility a 
user derives from buying a telephone depends directly on the number of other users connected to the telephone network.  
75
 J. P. Kesan and R. C. Shah, Setting Software Defaults: Perspectives from Law, Computer Science and Behavioral Economics (2006) 
Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 82, 583-634. 
76
 ibid. 
77
 ibid. 
78
 L. Edwards and I. Brown at FN71. See also J. T. L. Grimmelmann, Facebook and the Social Dynamics of Privacy (2009) Iowa Law 
Review, Vol. 95, No. 4, 1137. Also at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1262822 (last visited 14 July 2010). Grimmelmann argues that users 
will disable any feature that protects their privacy too much since, in social networking environments, anything that makes it harder for them 
to share information is a bug, not a feature. Edwards and Brown counter that restrictive privacy settings would at least make users aware, 
that there is such a thing a privacy defaults. 
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information, privacy groups as well as data protection regulators have identified a number of 
problems with this approach.  
In particular, they point out that changing default settings can be a laborious undertaking and often 
little information is provided to users on how the default settings can be reversed and how users’ 
objection to certain forms of processing or their withdrawal of consent can be signified. Again, market 
leader Facebook has had the dubious honour of producing the headlines in this respect. A graphic 
published by the New York Times in May 2010 shows that to manage their privacy on that site, at the 
time, users had to navigate through 50 settings with more than 170 choices79.  
It is interesting to note that the ‘bewildering tangle of options’ thus revealed was itself the result of 
a substantial overhaul by Facebook80 of its privacy settings following a reprimand, in July 2009, by the 
Canadian Privacy Commissioner. The Commissioner had criticised Facebook for having “serious 
privacy gaps in the way the site operates”81 and had recommended more transparency, to ensure that 
the site’s users have the information they need to make meaningful decisions about how widely they 
share personal information. Although this shows that SNS providers are taking steps to make 
adjustments to their terms of use and default settings in order to avoid a regulatory backlash, it seems 
that those steps all too often fail to actually address the underlying problems. For example, like many 
SNS providers, Facebook has taken on board criticism that its privacy setings were too complex and 
has made it considerably easier for those seeking to protect their privacy to access and amend those 
settings. However, problems remain particularly in those cases where the user’s privacy choices are 
overridden in the course of the introduction of new features82 or if users make changes to their profile 
or the content they upload. Anectodal evidence suggests, for example, that uploading a new profile 
photo will automatically make that photo accessible to the open internet, even if the user had chosen 
to restrict access to the previous photo to “friends only”.  
The draft Regulation acknowledges the difficulties users face when trying to control the purposes 
for which SNS providers and their customers may process their personal data through the use of 
privacy settings. Article 23(1) requires the data controller, both when determining the means for 
processing and at the time of the processing itself, to implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures and procedures in such a way that the processing will meet the requirements 
of the Regulation and ensure the protection of the rights of the data subject (“privacy by design”). 
Similarly, Article 23(2) states that data controllers must “implement mechanisms for ensuring that, by 
default, only those personal data are processed which are necessary for each specific purpose of the 
processing” (privacy-by default”). In addition, those mechanisms must ensure that “data is not 
collected or retained beyond the minimum necessary for those purposes, both in terms of the amount 
of the data and the time of their storage”. While these are admirable sentiments, it is difficult to see, 
how these requirements can be enforced in view of the constantly changing technology used by online 
providers. Although Article 23(3) gives the European Commission the right to adopt delegated acts 
for the purpose of specifying further criteria and requirements for the “appropriate measures and 
mechanisms” to be taken, the considerations already discussed with regard to Article 6(5)83 also apply 
here. As an executive body, the Commission lacks both the legitimacy and the necessary 
qualifications to adopt provisions of this kind so that the assessment of such measuers should be left 
to the EDPB and the national data protection authorities. By the same token, the Commission’s right 
________________
 
79 See FN64. In response to wide-spread criiticism, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg announced on 24 May 2010 that the site ‘is 
to revise its privacy settings within weeks to make it simpler for people to keep their information private’, see ‘Facebook to tweak 
privacy settings, says Zuckerberg’, Guardian, 24 May 2010 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/may/24/facebook-revise-
privacy-zuckerberg (last visited 30 October 2012). 
80 Facebook Press release, 27 August 2009 at http://www.facebook.com/press/releases.php?p=118816 (last visited 4 March 2010). 
81 Report of Findings by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of the Canada into the Complaint Filed by the Canadian Internet 
Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) against Facebook Inc. under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act, 16 July 2009 at http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2009/2009_008_0716_e.cfm (last visited 4 March 2010). 
82 See, for example, G Cluely, “Facebook changes privacy settings for millions of users - facial recognition is enabled”, 7 June 
2011; available at http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2011/06/07/facebook-privacy-settings-facial-recognition-enabled/; E Brown 
“Facebook Timeline privacy concerns deepen as rollout begins”, 19 December 2011; available at 
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/feeds/facebook-timeline-privacy-concerns-deepen-as-rollout-begins/4424; and last visited on 25 April 
2013;. 
83 See “Legitimate interest” above. 
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to “lay down technical standards for the requirements”84 is unlikely to provide sufficient protection of 
internet users’ privacy rights given the rapid pace of technological development.  
Co-regulatory or self-regulatory control and industry standards 
Because it is unlikely that users would challenge contractual terms until after harm has been caused to 
them by the misuse of personal data, efforts have been made to protect user privacy ex ante through 
model contracts for SN services, non-binding regulatory guidance85 or industry or co-regulatory codes 
of conduct. In the US, Facebook is unusual among the major SNS providers in being signatory to 
TrustE, the industry privacy seal program. This means, in principle, that Facebook’s privacy policy is 
subject to third party review. In the EU, SNS providers such as Bebo, Facebook, Google and 
Microsoft signed an agreement on “Safer Social Networking Principles for the EU” in February 
200986, which includes seven guiding principles for providers, covering issues such as raising 
awareness through education and training, and empowering users through technology and tools.  
However, in a report made available by the European Commission in September 2011, it found that 
while some steps had been taken, problems still existed with regard to tools available on the sites. It 
also found that only two of the signatories of the agreement had default settings which make minors' 
personal profiles accessible only to their approved list of contacts87. One could therefore argue that 
some SNS providers use the co- and self-regulatory approach to stave off more drastic regulatory 
measures. However, without at least the threat of such measures, it is doubtful whether the motivation 
of online services will be sufficient to ensure the protection of their users’ privacy where this 
seriously affects their revenue streams and with it their prospects of commercial success.  
Educational measures 
Until now, regulators seem to have put most of their effort into advising users how to act wisely on 
SNS. In the UK, the Information Commissioner has launched a website aimed at helping young 
people understand their information rights88. A similar website was launched in Germany supported 
by the state data protection commissioner in Saarland89 Although initiatives like these are important, 
there is currently very little evidence that they are in fact successful in overcoming user apathy. 
Further research is therefore required into the effectiveness of educational measures, given other 
social and cultural factors that may play a role in users’ choice of provider. Nevertheless, given the 
role that online services play in the development, social life and learning experience of most children 
at least in the developed world, greater emphasis should be placed on promoting an increased 
awareness of information rights and obligations in early-years and secondary education for children90. 
Additional rights and safeguards included in the draft Regulation 
In addition to the provisions described above, which largely constitute revisions of existing re-
quirements included in the Data Protection Directive, the draft Regulation also includes a number of 
additional rights and safeguards, designed to protect data subjects’ interests particularly in the online 
environment. While a detailed analysis of these additional rights goes beyond the scope of this article, 
________________
 
84 Article 23(4), draft Data Protection Regulation. 
85 See, for example, the ‘Good practice guidance for the providers of social networking and other user interactive services’, UK 
Home Office, 4 April 2008. 
86
 European Commission press release “Digital Agenda: social networks can do much more to protect minors' privacy - Commission 
report”, 30 September 2011; available at http://www.saferinternet.eu/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=9ea87190-cfe8-476a-babb-
59935aa08892&groupId=12160; last visited on 25 April 2013. 
87
 ‘Evaluation of the Implementation of the Safer Social Networking Principles for the EU Part I: General Report’, European 
Commission, January 2010 at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/social_networking/docs/final_report/first_part.pdf 
(last visited on 26 May 2010). 
88
 At http://www.ico.gov.uk/youth.aspx (last visited 1 November 2012). 
89
 At http://www.datenparty.de/ (last visited 1 November 2012). 
90 C Ewart and K Tisdall (2012) “Embedding information rights in the primary and secondary education systems of the United 
Kingdom: Phase 2 report for the Information Commissioner’s Office”, 31 March 2012; vailable at 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/about_us/research/~/media/documents/library/Corporate/Research_and_reports/embedding_information_rig
hts_phase_2_report.ashx; last visited on 25 April 2013. 
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reference can be made to (1) an extended right of the data subject to obtain from the controller the 
erasure of personal data relating to them and the abstention from further dissemination of such data 
(right to be forgotten and to erasure)91; (2) a new right to data portability, which would enable the data 
subject to obtain from the controller a copy of data undergoing processing in an electronic and struc-
tured format which is commonly used and allows for further use by the data subject92; and (3) a right 
not to be subject to measures based on profiling93. The latter includes measures that produce a legal 
effect concerning or significantly affecting the data subject, which is based solely on automated proc-
essing intended to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to him or to analyse or predict his per-
formance at work, economic situation, location, health, personal preferences, reliability or behaviour. 
 
Taken together, these rights may well have an impact on the level of control internet users can ex-
ercise in the context of their relationships with SNS providers. The right to data portability, which is 
designed to help Internet users to overcome network effects inherent in the services of the first-to-
market incumbents, might serve to address some of the power imbalance referred to above. However, 
the way in which it enables, if not encourages, the wider distribution of personal data sets to more 
than one provider must be kept under observation before the provision’s final impact can be assessed.  
 
Both the right to be forgotten and erasure and the right to be free from measures based on monitor-
ing face multiple criticism94 regarding both their technical feasibility and their suitability to protect 
Internet users’ true interest with the UK actually seeking an opt-out from the former95. Given that ne-
gotiations about the content of the draft Regulation are ongoing, it remains to be seen which of these 
provision will make it into the final draft unchanged. 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the fact that both national and EU regulators and the EU legislator are clearly aware of the 
need to improve the protection of internet users’ privacy and data protection rights, current thinking in 
this area seems to have stepped away from many of the conceptual foundations that informed data 
protection laws when they were first adopted in the 1970s and 80s. In particular, there now seems to 
be an increased call for a more “risk-based” approach to data protection that argues that where little or 
no harm is likely to be incurred by the data subject through individual processing activities, the inter-
ests of data controllers in the free flow of data should be given preference when exploiting personal 
data for their own commercial or administrative needs and that the regulatory burden should be kept 
low96. In this context, the definition of  “harm” is all to often reduced to mere economical loss and is 
looked at entirely from the perspective of the here and now with little attention being paid to the po-
tential unintended consequences that extensive data processing activities may be found to have in the 
future. This approach, which is germane to both the property-rights based approach and the fair proc-
essing paradigm, is a long way away from the assessment by the German Constitutional Court in its 
1984 Census decision that “under the conditions of automated data processing, there no longer is such 
a thing as ‘irrelevant’ data”97.  
________________
 
91 Article 17, draft Data Protection Regulation. 
92 Article 18, draft Data Protection Regulation. 
93 Article 18, draft Data Protection Regulation. 
94 See, for example, Spiegel online “'The Right to Be Forgotten': US Lobbyists Face Off with EU on Data Privacy Proposal”, 17 
October 2012; available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/us-government-and-internet-giants-battle-eu-over-data-
privacy-proposal-a-861773.html; T Brewster “Facebook: EU’s ‘Right To Be Forgotten’ Will Enforce More User Tracking”, 
TechWeek Europe, 6 December 2012; available at http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/facebook-europe-right-to-be-forgotten-
tracking-101253; last visited on 25 April 2013. 
95 O Bowcott “Britain seeks opt-out of new European social media privacy laws”, Guardian online, 4 April 2013; available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2013/apr/04/britain-opt-out-right-to-be-forgotten-law; last visited on 25 April 2013. 
96 This position was most recently reaffirmed by the ICO in its submission to the House of Commons Justice Committee that was 
tasked with assessing the impact of the EU reforms. The ICO argued in favour of its own “better regulatory approach of risk-based 
proportionate intervention”, paragraph 50; see “Report of the HoC Justice Committee on the European Union Data Protection 
framework proposals”, 24 October 2012, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmjust/572/57202.htm, last visited 1 November 2012. 
97 FN8, paragraph 158. 
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In reality, the threat that the on-going technological innovation presents to EU citizens’ fundamen-
tal right to privacy is only increasing. The term “Big Data” has turned into a watchword for the in-
creasing power that the unrestricted collection and use of individuals’ personal information has be-
stowed on both public and commercial players. Unless steps are taken now to ensure that the informa-
tion privacy rights we have taken for granted in an offline environment are also protected online, the 
opportunity to entrench those rights in the digital space may be missed for a very long time, if not 
forever.  
 
With every new data-hungry application and business model that is developed, a new infrastruc-
ture embeds itself into our daily lives. This may have long-term consequences that we are not yet able 
to foresee but which may change the delicate balance of power between individuals, commercial enti-
ties and public bodies that our democratic constitutions were designed to create and maintain. This 
may ultimately not only affect the rights and freedoms of Internet users, but also the competitiveness 
of online businesses and the foundations of democratic government itself.  
 
It is already possible to observe an increasing lack of trust on the part of Internet users in certain 
online services. Despite the initial attraction of those services, fuelled by curiosity and a natural hu-
man desire to communicate with others, and the network effect, which continues to bind users to 
those services once they have joined, we may yet reach a tipping point when that lack of trust begins 
to outweigh both those factors. A lack of effective privacy protection could thus ultimately have a 
negative impact on individuals’ willingness to use online services to their full potential both in the 
private arena and for the purpose of political participation.  
 
Many EU member states already recognise this problems and are taking unilateral steps to address 
the most pressing issues at national level98. To ensure the protection of both its citizens’ rights and its 
businesses’ competitiveness as well as to avoid the multi-speed development of a new regulatory 
framework for online services, the EU institutions must now also follow up their manifold statements 
of intent with considered and well-balanced legislation. It is at least doubtful whether the current pro-
posals for a reform of the EU data protection framework are capable of achieving this aim even if 
they were adopted in their current form. Any further watering down of the level of protection that this 
version provides might seriously put at risk more than just an individual or property right. 
 
In particular, there is a strong case to be made for the contention that EU data protection law 
should “go back to its roots” and revisit the principle of data minimisation. This principle provides by 
far the strongest safeguard against the abuse of personal data both for commercial and for political 
purposes as data that has never been collected is not available for covert or overt, lawful or illegiti-
mate re-purposing. An ex ante data minimisation principle is therefore likely to be more effective in 
protecting individuals’ information privacy rights than ex post facto controls of processing activities 
in relation to data that is already in existence. 
 
In this context, some recognition must be given to the way in which the draft Regulation already 
seeks to strengthen this principle. Where the current Data Protection Directive merely stipulates that 
personal data should only be collected for “specified, explicit and legitimate purposes”99, Article 5(c) 
of the draft Regulation would limit the data controller’s right to process personal data “to the mini-
mum necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed”. This mirrors to some extent 
________________
 
98 See, for example, measures taken by the independent data protection Commissioner for German state Schleswig-Holstein against 
the tracking of Facebook users and non-users through the “Like” button, Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-
Holstein, “ULD to website owners: „Deactivate Facebook web analytics“, 19 August 2011, available at 
https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/presse/20110819-facebook-en.htm; and the effect of the Irish data protection authorities rec-
ommendations for measures that need to be taken by the same company to ensure compliance with Irish data protection laws, Irish 
Data Protection Commissioner, “Report of Review of Facebook Ireland’s Implementation of Audit Recommendations Published – 
Facebook turns off Tag Suggest in the EU”, 21 September 2012, available at 
https://www.dataprotection.ie/viewdoc.asp?Docid=1233&Catid=66&StartDate=1+January+2012&m=n, both last visited on 31 
October 2012. 
99 Article 6(1)(b), Data Protection Directive and Article 5(a), draft Data Protection Regulation.  
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the requirement included in §3a of the German Data Protection Act100 which states that the collection, 
processing and use of personal data must be guided by the objective to process as little data as possi-
ble. The problem with regard to data minimisation is, of course, that its success is strongly dependent 
on the enforcement capabilities of data protection authorities. Without strong powers of inspection 
and oversight, even the best data minimisation principle is likely to develop into “a custom more hon-
oured in the breach than the observance”.  
 
Similarly, clear similarities can be identified between the relationship between users and providers 
of online services (specifically SNS) and consumers and businesses. In both cases, the parties clearly 
possess unequal bargaining power when entering into a contractual relationship. Outside a clear regu-
latory framework, this can lead to the user/consumer being forced to transact on the basis of contrac-
tual provisions that were designed to benefit the business/provider. In the context of a consumer sale, 
this could mean that the consumer would have to accept, for example, far reaching limitations of li-
ability, restrictions on the consumer’s ability to terminate the contract in case of non-performance or 
reversals of the burden of proof in those cases. Consumer protection laws in almost all jurisdictions 
therefore provide a framework that, while restricting the consumer’s personal autonomy to a certain 
extent, also protects him from the most unreasonable demands of those in a stronger bargaining posi-
tion. In this context, the restriction of the user’s contractual freedom is accepted in the interest of en-
forcing a fairer balance between the perceived commercial interests of both parties. In many cases, 
this is achieved by the adoption of certain “good faith” requirements on the part of both parties com-
bined with an agreed list of “behaviours” or contractual clauses that would make the contractual rela-
tionship between the parties void or voidable.  
 
Given that personal data has now replaced money as a form of payment for many of the services 
rendered in an online context, there may therefore be a case for a legal framework that protects users’ 
personal information along similar lines. As outlined above, in the context of data protection law, this 
approach could entail imposing restrictions on the type of processing activities to which a data subject 
can lawfully consent as well as restrictions on the type of processing activities a data controller can 
justify through reliance on the “legitimate interest condition”. As is already the case in consumer pro-
tection law, any processing carried out in violation of such stipulations would be unlawful and render 
the controller in breach of his data protection obligations.  
 
While it cannot be denied that an effective protection of information privacy in an online context 
may ultimate require the use of a variety of regulator constraints, including a change in the social 
norms that govern the disclosure, sharing and use of personal information; the use of code-based solu-
tions like privacy-by-default and privacy-by-design technologies that restrict the collection of per-
sonal data ab initio; and a developing market in privacy-friendly applications, services and business 
models, it seems obvious that all of these approaches would not only be complemented, but also fa-
cilitated, by a stronger legal framework.  To achieve its full potential, such a framework must perceive 
information privacy as a means to protect individuals’ rights both as consumers (individual right to 
privacy) and as citizens of democratic systems with a responsibility to contribute to the upholding of 
those systems’ moral and political values (privacy as a common good). To sacrifice one or the other in 
the name of economical growth or political convenience is to open the door to potential abuse by a 
variety of public and private entities with long-term consequences that we may not yet be able to con-
ceive. 
________________
 
100 Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG). 
